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A Test of the Household Separation
Hypothesis in Rwanda
James E. Anderson
University of San Francisco
April 2015

Abstract: How does a farm household in rural Africa react when the government decides
crop selection? In developing countries, agricultural households strive to optimize a risk
mitigating utility function rather than a traditional agricultural production function.
These households are termed “non-separated” as their farming efforts are directed
towards family food security rather than maximizing agricultural profits. The lack of
integration with labor and commodity markets makes these non-separated households
difficult to influence with policy initiatives. Various tests for household separation have
been developed.
We use a unique dataset from Rwanda to evaluate these separation tests. The data
include households forced into a separated economic model by government policy, as
well as, those partially separated and others that remained non-separated. We create a
modified test for separation using a measure of the alignment of the production and
consumption functions.
Last, we hypothesize that farm households forced into partial separation will alter their
crop selection on their other plots to mitigate the perceived risk to family food security.
We find a weak association between crop selection on these plots and the consumption
profile of the household.

I would like to thank my advisor Elizabeth Katz, professors Alessandra Cassar and Yaniv Stopnitsky, for their
patience and advice guiding me through this analysis. I also want to thank the Rwandan team led by Dr. Herman
Musahara, Former Vice Provost of the National University of Rwanda, Dr. Theophile Niyonzima, Dr. Claude
Bizimana and Jean-Marie Biraza. Grant funding from USAID arranged by Anna Knox is gratefully acknowledged.

1. INTRODUCTION
Land is the principle endowment for developing countries without abundant natural
resources. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the agricultural sector
supports in excess of 80% of the population in these areas. Successful exploitation of land and
the agricultural sector is an important policy priority to improve incomes and food security for
the poor. These facts are especially prominent in Rwanda, a land-locked country with the
highest population density in Africa (487 per square km).
Land in Rwanda’s agricultural sector is fragmented to the extent that the average farmhousehold works with only 0.75 hectares (EICV3 Thematic Report – Agriculture). The FAO
estimates that a Rwandan household requires a minimum of 0.9 ha to sustain normal caloric
levels. That 17 percent shortfall has prompted new government land-use policies.
In 2008, the Government of Rwanda (GoR) introduced the Land Use Consolidation
Program (LUC) and the Crop Intensification Program (CIP) under Organic Land Law No
08/2005, defined as “a procedure of putting together small plots of land in order to manage the
land and use it in an efficient manner.” The objective is to encourage small plot farmers to
consolidate holdings and shift to the priority food crops of maize, wheat, rice, Irish potato,
cassava, soybeans and beans (Kathiresan 2012).
The LUC program is controversial. There is a debate about its effectiveness in
improving yields. There has been significant disruption in land tenure In Rwanda over the last
18 years due to the return of over 2.5 million refugees. The resettlement of these refugees into
new villages (Imidugudu) tended to put them in the better agricultural areas decreasing
average plot size and producing no benefit in agricultural output (Kondylis 2008). As a result
of Imidugudu and the LUC program, there are concerns among farmers about losing control
over their land and their farming decisions.
This research proposes to examine the impact of the Land Use Consolidation program
from the perspective of farm households that were shifted into the separated economic model by
the LUC program. We will first examine several tests for household separation and propose a
modified version specifically considering the alignment of farm production with the
consumption preferences of the household. We assess crop selection as a possible measure of
reactions among households that had only a portion their land under the government program.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 will review the relevant
literature, section 3 will present the research methodology and the data, section 4 will evaluate
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various tests for separation, section 5 will consider possible risk mitigating crop selection by
survey subjects and section 6 will conclude.

2. BACKGROUND
Russian economist A. V. Chayanov first described the economics of peasant or
subsistence farm households in 1926 (Low 2000 and Thorner 1966). In his view the peasant
farmer seeks to organize production to maximize a utility function driven by household
demographics and the related consumption preferences. Chayanov’s key insight was that the
subsistence farm-household represents a complete and virtually closed economic system of
supply and demand. His simple production function using only market prices and labor,
𝑌 = 𝑃! ∙ 𝑓 𝐿 , formed the key to maximizing a utility function composed of income and

leisure,  𝑈 = 𝑓 𝑌, 𝑙 . This model has four key assumptions: (1) the absence of a labor market; (2)
output, whether sold or consumed, is valued at the market price; (3) farm size is variable even in
the short-term and (4) there is a minimum acceptable consumption level. Thus, there are three
limiting factors to maximizing farm household utility: the potential output of the production
function, the minimum income or consumption constraint and a labor pool composed only of
household members.
Chayanov also noted that the peasant household did not follow normal economic
precepts. For example, it was not unusual for the investment in labor to exceed the marginal
value product of that labor. This MPL or shadow wage could vary widely by household. His
data showed an inverse relationship between farm size and productivity. This inverse
productivity relationship violates a fundamental tenant of the production function – positive or
constant returns to scale. Today we refer to Chayanov’s farm household model as a nonseparated household.
The puzzle of this inverse relationship became the focus of decades of research
producing a profound understanding of the complexities of the non-separated farm household.
In 1962, economic philosopher, Amartya Sen, documented the same phenomenon in India.
Since then, this aspect of non-separated households has been found in dozens of countries in
Africa (Barrett, 1996; Collier, 1983; Kimhi, 2006), Asia (Akram-Lodhi, 2001; Benjamin &
Brandt, 2002; Carter, 1984; Heltberg, 1998; Rios & Shively, 2005), Europe (Alvarez & Arias,
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2004) and Latin America (Berry & Cline, 1979)1. Using data from 1991, Byiringiro and
Reardon (1996), found a 300% yield advantage for smaller farms in Rwanda.
Numerous research projects1 have attempted to explain this inverse relationship puzzle
by evaluating the subsistence farm-household as a traditional profit-maximizing business entity
ignoring the household consumption preferences. This research has significantly advanced the
understanding of all aspects of these economic entities.
2.1 Missing Markets
One line of research points to the lack of markets and effective pricing for the factors of
production as the source of misallocation of household resources. These inefficient markets
push farm-households to make uneconomic resource allocation decisions. The consequences can
be seen in four areas:
Without an effective labor market, farmers have no way to measure their opportunity
costs and will continue to work their small plots long after the marginal value of their labor has
become unprofitable (Sen 1966). In Rwanda, the lack of external labor markets produces a
concentration of labor on small plots (Byiringiro and Reardon 1996) increasing yields albeit at
the cost of investing in labor beyond its marginal product. A secondary issue stemming from a
thin labor market is the inability to hire and supervise workers needed for expansion. This
limits the scale of the farm-household to the family time-endowment to work the land (Eswaran
and Kotwal 1986).
In land scarce markets a greater share of farm returns flow to the land production
factor (Benjamin and Brandt 1997). These excess returns and the related low returns to labor
are fundamental to the inverse productivity phenomenon. The lack of a land market either for
sales or leasing means that more productive farmers will not be able to acquire more land thus
preserving the inverse relationship status quo (Byiringiro and Reardon 1996). The lack of a
land market reinforces the separated household model.
Most small plot farmers are unable to diversify into cash crops in part because there
are no effective markets for their staples or a distribution channels for cash crops. Consequently
the non-separated farm-household production is aligned with consumption preferences rather
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1	
  Barrett,	
  Christopher	
  B.,	
  Marc	
  F.	
  Bellemare,	
  and	
  Janet	
  Y.	
  Hou.	
  "Reconsidering	
  Conventional	
  Explanations	
  of	
  the	
  

Inverse	
  Productivity-‐Size	
  Relationship.“	
  Duke	
  University,	
  Department	
  of	
  Economics,	
  (2009).	
  

	
  

4

than market prices (Le 2010). Production decisions may depend simply on household
composition rather than commodity market factors of supply and demand (Ligon 2011).
Finally, the lack of access to capital markets or credit, limits the farmer’s ability to
acquire additional inputs whether it is land, improved seeds and fertilizer or small-scale
mechanization (Eswaran and Kotwal 1986).
2.2 Measurement Error
Lamb, (2003) considered the potential that the theoretical violations of the nonseparated household were the result of measurement error, which is a component of the error
term that would be correlated with plot size. The study found a reversal of the inverse
relationship when comparing fixed effects against a random effects model, leading to the
conclusion that the dependent variable was subject to measurement error. This conclusion was
supported by an instrumental variable estimation as well.
2.3 Farmer Skills and The Non-Separated Household Hypothesis
If occupational choice is endogenous and the most skilled farmers remain as farmers
then not controlling for this effect will overstate the inverse productivity relationship of nonseparated households (Assunção and Ghatak (2003). The occupational choice hypothesis seems
tenuous in an environment with missing labor markets. Studies using farmer age and education
as a proxy for their skill level did not account for the small plot yield advantage (Kondylis
2008). The non-separated household hypothesis might explain a preference for small plots as a
risk management mechanism permitting the topographical diversification. Barrett and
Bellemare (2010) also found that unobserved household heterogeneity due to risk preferences
or varying shadow prices explained only about 30% of the small plot yield advantage of nonseparated households. Even within a household, yields were smaller on larger plots effectively
ending the farmer skill heterogeneity debate at least for India (Assunção and Braido 2007).
2.4 Soil and Land Quality
Soil quality is thought to be a key unobserved variable explaining the behavior of the
non-separated household. There is some logic to think that better quality land would initially
be more densely populated and that over the years, passing those better plots through
generations of inheritance would further sub-divide them so that eventually the yield
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differences would be quite noticeable (May 1995). An analysis with detailed scientific soil
quality measurements in Madagascar’s rice region addressed this issue and found a persistent
0.28% loss of yield for every 1% increase in plot size after controlling for soil quality (Barrett
and Bellemare 2010).
Kikhi (2006) sought to evaluate the endogeneity of cropland decision by the farmers
using two linear recursive equations: one for the decision to allocate land to a given crop and a
second one to explain the yield. This strategy allows for a cropping prediction to measure
against actual allocation to control for endogeneity.
His simulation predicted decreasing yields initially
then increasing at a certain plot size. These results
replicated a study that included much larger farms in
showing increasing yields at 10 acres (4 ha) and with
a productivity curve following a more traditional
positive return to scale beyond that size (Carter,
Weibe and Blarel 1990). (See graph) This may be
the plot size where economies of scale become a
factor.
This u-shaped size-yield curve might indicate that many empirical studies have
focused only on very small plots (under 3 ha) typically found in developing countries. This
leaves only the downward sloping leg of the u-curve for analysis. In effect, the agricultural
sector scrutinized by researchers did not have any observations with plots large enough to
resolve the inverse productivity relationship conundrum.
2.5 Measuring Household Separation
Benjamin (1992) approaches the separation question using household demographics
and external labor markets to develop labor supply and demand functions. His model focuses
on the labor market to test for nonmarket allocations of labor and the potential correlation with
household demographic structure, which would be an indication of non-separation. Any
divergence from the neo-classical labor demand model where the first-order condition (MPL) is
correlated with household structure would indicate non-separation. He further analyzes the
shadow wage and its relationship to labor supply, demand and the optimal amount of labor to
determine if household demographic variables impact the demand for labor.
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Benjamin assumes exogeneity of household composition but instruments for wages
with clustered regional wages and family structure with local population density to understand
the power of the test if this assumption fails. He argues that endogeneity does not affect his
results if household structure is recursive to the labor demand function. More likely omitted
variables may be correlated with both household structure and labor demand.
Key to his test is the relationship between the market wage, the shadow wage and
household structure. In the non-separation profile, labor demand is a function of the two wage
rates (shadow and market) and household demographics. The error term here is at risk of
containing numerous unobserved variables that impact labor demand. After efforts to resolve
this he states succinctly, “Unfortunately, there does not exists a convincing set of instruments
with which to control for the potential endogeneity of household structure.”
He summarizes the endogeneity concern with a simple statistical model, where L is
labor, A is land, w is the market wage and n is the household demographic structure:
log 𝐿 = 𝛼! + 𝛾! log 𝐴 + 𝛽! log 𝑤    + 𝛿 log 𝑛 + 𝜖! ,
log  𝑛   = 𝛼! + 𝛾! log 𝐴 + 𝛽! log 𝑤    + 𝜃 log 𝐿 + 𝜖!

Testing for 𝛿 equal zero implies separation. If 𝛿 ≠ 0  𝑜𝑟  𝑐𝑜𝑣   𝜖! , 𝜖! ≠ 0,  then labor use
determines family size. Household structure is not random and is determined, in part, by land
size and the income available to support a larger family. If household size changes with
seasonal demand then we would have non-separation and production and household structure
would be inter-dependent.
Similar to Chanayov, Benjamin’s theoretical construct is based on a twice differentiable,
quasi-concave household utility function defined by consumption (c), leisure (l) and an
exogenous vector of household characteristics (a) such as age and gender of household
members. 𝑢! = 𝑢(𝑐, 𝑙; 𝑎). This is combined with a classic twice differentiable convex production
function 𝑞 = 𝐹  (𝐿;   𝐴), where L is the sum of family and hired labor and A is land (fixed and
exogenous). In a separated household profits are maximized independent of the utility function.
In separation, the optimal amount of labor, from all sources, is not a result of household
structure but depends only on technology and wages. The underlying assumptions can break
down if farmers have a preference for working their own land (an addition to utility which is
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not necessarily economic), hired labor is not a perfect substitute for family labor or the external
labor market is weak so there are no outside employment opportunities.
Identification of non-separation is observed in a correlation between household
demographics and labor deployed on the farm. The first order condition of consequence is
MPL, which equals w*, the shadow wage, and is endogenous to household labor supply and
demand. Shadow wage is seen as a function of household demographics and the market wage.
In constrained labor markets MPL cannot be optimized.
Benjamin looks at three cases testing only for separation of the household rice operations
not the entire economic household: (1) where outside labor is constrained by weak markets (2)
where labor demand exceeds supply (during peak harvest for example) and (3) where wages for
outside employment are different than wages for hired-in labor.
His theoretical approach stipulates a non-separated household would have a strong
correlation between household structure and farm labor allocation. His empirical results did
not support this notion of excess or constrained labor supply related to household
demographics noting, “The power of the test is limited by the degree that farmers turn to their
own farms for extra work.”
Jacoby (1993) begins with the theoretical recursive two-stage maximization problem
whereby the farm household focuses on farm profits first then family utility conditional on farm
output. He develops a Cobb-Douglas production function to determine labor demand but was
constrained by the Peruvian data set that lacked quantity data on farm variable inputs. He
divides farm labor into four groups: hired, adult male, adult female and teenagers. He addresses
the endogeneity issue using instruments of community level wages and prices. The coefficient
inputs for the different worker groups did not vary much between his OLS and IV estimates in
the labor supply function.
He uses this production function to derive marginal product of labor for the different
labor participation groups regressing them on wages: 𝑀𝑃𝐿! = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑊! + 𝑒! . In this formulation,
an efficient labor market and separated household implies 𝑎 = 0  and  𝑏 = 1, and that 𝑒! will
contain the usual measurement and optimization errors but should be independent of the desire
to work. Since wage is part of the measurement error problem he instruments for it with age,
education and associated quadratic terms. Despite a strong relationship between marginal
product of labor and the shadow wage, the hypothesis of that 𝑎 = 0  and  𝑏 = 1, is rejected in the
Peruvian data indicating, according to this test, that they are non-separated households.
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Le (2010) revisits both Benjamin and Jacoby. He eschews the development of a full
production function and all of its complexities for a simpler form: 𝑄 =    𝐿!"   𝑓  (𝑧, 𝐹), where f( ) is
a general non-parametric form allowing him to focus only on the relationship between labor
and output. He applies both Jacoby: log
log

!"

!"
!

=    − log 𝜆! + 𝛽 log 𝑤 + 𝜖! , and Benjamin:

= − log 𝜆! + 𝛼𝐴 + 𝜀! , in simplified form then combines the two in a joint

!"

estimation: log

!"
!

=    − log 𝜆! + 𝛽 log 𝑤 + 𝛼𝐴 +   𝜖! . He also adds factors to control for fixed

effects with a regional location dummies. In his Vietnam dataset, the separated model was
rejected in all instances.

Summary of Key Farm-Household Research
Topic

Missing Land Markets

Missing Labor Markets

Access To Capital or
Credit

INVERSE RELATIONSHIP PERSISTS
Benjamin & Brandt (1997)

Dorward (1999)

Barrett, Bellemare and Hou (2009)
Kimhi (2006)
Matchaya 2007)
Sen (1962)
Byiringiro & Reardon (1996) Rwanda
Barrett, Bellemare and Hou (2009)

Muhinda & Dusengemungu (2011) Rwanda

Soil or Land Quality
Farmer Skill or
Household
Heterogeneity

Eswaran & Kotwal (1986)

Muhinda & Dusengemungu (2011) Rwanda

Matchaya 2007)
Dorward (1999)

May (1995) Rwanda
Byiringiro & Reardon (1996) Rwanda

Lamb (2003)

Barrett, Bellemare and Hou (2009)

Chen, Huffman and Rozelle (2011)

Assunção and Ghatak (2003)
Kondylis (2008)
Assunção and Braido (2007)

Measurement Error
Non-separation Model
(risk management)
Irrigation

	
  

Lamb (2003)
Benjamin (1992)
Jacoby (1993)
Le (2010)
Dorward (1999)

Inefficient Commodity
Markets
Population Density
Historical Migration
Patterns

INVERSE RELATIONSHIP EXPLAINED

Lamb (2003)
Benjamin (1992)
Jacoby (1993)

Chayanov (1923)
Ligon (2011)
Le (2010)
Dillon (2010)
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3. THE DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Rwanda is divided into 10 zones with specific climatic and topographical attributes
including rainfall, temperature, rivers, marshes, hills and average elevation. Overlapping these
10 zones are 5 provinces (4 excluding the mostly urban area around Kigali for this study) and
30 administrative districts some of which may contain 2 or more agro-climatic zones. These are
further subdivided into 416 sectors. There are two main growing seasons each year.
The Crop Intensification Program (CIP) and Land Use Consolidation (LUC) program
were implemented at the administrative district level with significant local authority. Once the
Rwanda Agricultural Board (RAB) had identified potential areas for priority crops, the local
district authorities were given targets to reduce the gap between current crop levels and the
target levels set by the RAB. The districts are held accountable to achieving these levels of land
consolidation and priority crop production but the actual process of consolidation and plot
management may vary between districts.
To reduce farmer resistance to the LUC program, the GoR offered a variety of
incentives including subsidized improved seeds and fertilizers, access to extension services,
distribution and post harvest technologies such as driers and storage (Muhinda and
Dusengemungu 2012). Sometimes the promised services were not delivered and after 2 years
the subsidies for fertilizer were reduced eventually reaching zero after 4 years. Despite these
incentives, most farmers in our focus groups did not describe the program as voluntary. For
example, it was not permitted for a farmer in the middle of a consolidated area to simply opt
out. As a result of this process, implementation of LUC and CIP at the district and sector level
was not random.
3.1 The Instrument and Survey Process
The team from the National University of Rwanda (NUR) conducting the household
surveys was financed by USAID to test the impact of the government’s Land Use
Consolidation (LUC) policies. Three teams of 5 enumerators surveyed 742 households in 24
sectors during October of 2013. The sites represented all of the ten agro-ecological zones. The
sites included some of the oldest LUC implementations and all of the crops identified in the
CIP. Site selection in the NUR study was not random and was in part a result of negotiations
with the Rwandan Agricultural Board, whose consent was needed for the study to proceed.
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Site%Distribu+on%by%District%

5.$Gikondo$
1.$Tumba$

6.$Manjari$
15.$Tyazo$

2.$Mpinga$

8.$Gisha$

13.$Gikoma$
7.$Rukore$

3.$Nyagasozi$II$

19.$Karehe$
11.$Rugende$$
18.$Kavumu$$
12.$NtoviImugwato$

10.$Kibilizi$
14. Rwakina$

16.$Kigende$
16.$Kigende$
17.$Nyakagezi$

4.$Rubumba$$
9.$Nkanda$

The survey instrument we developed was extensive covering all aspects of household
activity including complete family demographics and a full profile of an agricultural production
function at the plot level. The survey included plot size, seed types, and use of inputs, like
fertilizer and pesticide, as well as, detailed labor content by function. Harvest results were
collected for both agricultural seasons included main crops and secondary crops as it has been
common practice to intercrop, for example, maize with climbing or bush beans.
Data was also collected regarding outside labor markets, hired-in labor, wages, and key
commodity prices. Finally, household experience with food shortages and other shocks was
detailed, as well as, the alignment of the farm production with the household consumption
patterns for the main staples. Thus, all of the primary inputs are available to properly test the
separation hypothesis.
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3.2 Selection Bias
Despite the obvious site selection bias, for the test of the separation hypothesis within
the sectors, household selection was random, as the plots were spatially assigned to treatment.
In every instance when asked, focused group respondents replied that individual plots were
selected by location not ownership or any other household attribute.
We tested the treatment selection criteria by plot against a number of alternative
possibilities. Evaluating the “location only perspective” we looked at the relationship between
plot type (uphill, valley or lowland), erosion protection, and a vector of other household
variables (a wealth index, a complete test of demographics, education levels etc.) to see which
were significant for inclusion of a particular plot in a LUC project. The only significant
indictors were land type (uphill), erosion protections and the number of adult males in the
household. Summary statistics comparing plots selected for the LUC program and other plots
are presented in Table I.
Table'I'4'Summary'Plot'Statictics'
Comparing'Location'and'Topographical'Plot'Data
Non4LUC
Selected'for'LUC
N
mean
N
mean
'''''Plot'Location'and'Type
Plot%Size
423 %%35.754
%%%985 %%%%33.698
Distance%from%HH
414 %%%%0.832
%%%964 %%%%%%0.748
Uphill
423 %%%%0.825
%%%985 %%%%%%0.581
Lowland
423 %%%%0.106
%%%985 %%%%%%0.232
Erosion%Protection%(terraces)
423 %%%%0.121
%%%985 %%%%%%0.265
Erosion%Protection%(ditches)
423 %%%%0.600
%%%985 %%%%%%0.403
Erosion%Protection%(fences)
423 %%%%0.007
%%%985 %%%%%%0.026
Erosion%Protection%(other)
423 %%%%0.113
%%%985 %%%%%%0.164

t
0.265
1.218
9.086
E5.535
E6.055
6.922
E2.341
E2.466

*
*
*
*
*
*

The history and method by which a Rwandan family might acquire ownership of a
particular plot in a particular location is complex. Plot ownership is the result of generations of
inheritance and sub-division, deaths due to the genocide in 1994, massive movements of almost
3 million refugees in and out of the country and government administrative programs
attempting to adjudicate conflicting claims to redress the loss of property in the various civil
clashes some going back to 1959.
As a result, it is not unusual for one household to own 2 or 3 plots widely dispersed. In
this sample, 62% of households owned more than one plot. The size, location and ownership of
more than 10 million plots were finalized in a land registration program completed in 2012.
The surveyed households were variously affected by the LUC program with 13% having no
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involvement, 29% with some but not all of their plots included, and 57% with all their land
under the LUC policy. This variation provides an excellent context to evaluate the degree of
household separation resulting from the program, as well as, the reaction of households with
some of their land in the program.
3.3 Description of Key Data Elements
3.31 Land and Plot Data
There are 1,413 plots in the data set for the 675 households. We collected 3 data points
on the size of each plot: the dimensions and the area. Comparing the two we found them to be
consistent. As a result of the recent land registration program cited above, the farmers had
good knowledge of their plot sizes. Fortunately, an often-troubling source of error for
agricultural household studies, land size, has been significantly reduced in this study.
We also collected detailed information for each plot including main and secondary
crops, and a list of who worked on each plot and for how many days a month. Inputs were
catalogued as well, including seed type, fertilizer type and pesticides used. For each input we
collected information on the source as well as any government subsidies for that input. Finally,
detailed harvest data was recorded along with amounts sold in the market and related prices.
3.32 Wages and Labor Markets
Family labor by household member and gender, as well as, hired labor was tracked in
days per month. This statistic was then compared with functional labor data covering land
preparation, planting, fertilizing etc. The total functional labor days were approximately double

N=675

Table'II'O'Labor'Use
Average'
Average'
Average'
Percent' Avg'Total' Percent' Average'Hired'
Family'
Daily'Wage' Daily'Wage'
Use Person'Days Hire
Person'Days'(a) Person'Days'
Men
Women
(b)

Labor+Type
Groud'Preperation
99% ''''''''''19.99
61% '''''''''''''''''''15.55 ''''''''''22.90
Planting
99% ''''''''''10.64
55% '''''''''''''''''''11.35 ''''''''''10.21
Fertilizing
76% ''''''''''''6.49
31% ''''''''''''''''''''' 6.83 ''''''''''''6.34
Irrigating
7% ''''''''''12.67
2% ''''''''''''''''''''' 2.71 ''''''''''16.07
Weeding
97% ''''''''''15.39
55% '''''''''''''''''''15.67 ''''''''''15.21
Harvesting
97% ''''''''''''9.79
51% '''''''''''''''''''10.18 ''''''''''''9.56
Transport'to'market
37% ''''''''''''3.86
15% ''''''''''''''''''''' 4.07 ''''''''''''3.76
''(a)'For'those'HH'hiring'labor'for'this'function,'the'average'hired'days'used
''(b)'For'those'HH'using'labor'for'this'function,'the'average'days'used
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'''''''''''''730
'''''''''''''747
'''''''''''''744
'''''''''''''786
'''''''''''''723
'''''''''''''779
''''''''''1,052

'''''''''''''710
'''''''''''''707
'''''''''''''741
'''''''''''''800
'''''''''''''717
'''''''''''''740
'''''''''''''849

Female'
Wage'
Discount
2.72%
5.33%
0.47%
O1.82%
0.74%
5.03%
19.27%

Labor'Days'
Per'Hectare'
''''''''''27.94
''''''''''14.87
''''''''''''9.07
''''''''''17.71
''''''''''21.50
''''''''''13.68
''''''''''''5.40

the days per month, which matches well with the 2 - 3 months of high labor activity during the
four-month season. (Table II)
Only 91 households reported working outside on other farm for cash wages. The
reported wage rates were from 15 geographically dispersed sectors and were remarkably
consistent averaging Rwf 734 per day with a standard deviation of only Rwf 40.
Table!III!F!Cross!Tab!of!Hiring!In!and!Hiring!Out
!
Use!family!labor?!
Wage!Employment!Last!Year?
!
NonFAgricultural!Employment!Last!Year?

Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes

N=!675
640
35
102
573
30

Hired!Labor
56.4
97.1
59.8
61.8
90.0

No!Hired!
Labor
43.6
2.9
40.2
38.2
10.0

Subject households were more likely to use hired labor. (Table III) There were 1,481
observations of households hiring labor from the “days per month” question and 5,430
observations from the functional labor questions. The difference is due to possible recording of
the same worker planting and then later weeding. Wages were modestly lower for the “days
per month” hired labor and more variable averaging Rwf 692 per day with a standard deviation
of Rwf 181. The functional hired labor wages averaged Rwf 745 per day with a standard
deviation of 234. The survey results show that wages are very consistent across Rwanda
possibly owing to the small size of the country and the relatively efficient regional bus systems.
These tables imply that there is a fairly active labor market with 56.4% of households
buying labor to supplement the family workforce and 102 households with a family member
working outside for a wage.
3.33 Crop Prices
Crop price data included 925 observations covering 17 different crops. All of the CIP
crops were well represented in the price data. For the purposes of the separation test, to ensure
a harvest value (p*Q), I assigned prices to all farms whether they reported selling any crops or
not. In the case of missing prices, where the household was either consuming their harvest or
the data were simply not reported, I assigned average prices as calculated from observations for
the same crop in the same sector. There are significant regional variations in market prices due
to transport costs and intermediaries. What interest us here are the farm gate prices, which

	
  

14

were remarkably consistent. For example, maize was harvested and sold in 17 sectors with only
a modest variation in the mean price.
3.34 Harvest Quantities
There are two growing seasons in Rwanda. This study focuses on only the first season
as the field surveys were conducted before the complete harvest results were available for the
second season. As is typical in studies of this type, the harvest volumes were self-reported not
measured in the field. Rwandans grow a wide variety of crops so it is not possible to compare
crop yields across the sample of 675 households. Instead a harvest value variable is created
from the product of the farm gate prices and the reported harvest volume for each crop
produced by the household.
3.35 Household Food Security Risk Profile
To assess possible risk aversion to the
separated household model, data were collected on
food availability and other household shocks. More
than 66% of households reported not having
enough to eat one day in the most recent week
implying that food security would be a high
priority for the family farm production. Food
availability follows a pattern aligned with the two
growing seasons with February and October being
the worst months. To supplement the food
shortage risk we collected data on a variety of
negative household shocks with the caveat that the

Table&IV&9&Houshold&Shocks
Shock&Factor
Obs.
Drought
289
Floods
50
Landslide
8
Crop<pest/disease
38
Epidemic
9
Food<prices
36
Ag<imput<costs
117
Job<loss
74
Illness/Accident
43
Death<of<Head
24
Violence
14
Death/working<member
11
Death<of<other<member
6
Theft
12
Hail
45
Very<low<crop<prices
121
&&&&&Total
897

Percent
32.2%
5.6%
0.9%
4.2%
1.0%
4.0%
13.0%
8.2%
4.8%
2.7%
1.6%
1.2%
0.7%
1.3%
5.0%
13.5%

shock “affected your household’s ability to eat or
changed what you owned”. These summary statistics are presented in Table IV.	
  
3.35 Endogeneity Concerns
The peasant farm-household is a closed economic system and consequently is rife with
endogenous relationships. Consumption is determined by family size, which also determines, in
a large part, the labor pool. Productivity of labor is also a function of household structure so
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that arriving at a clear separation of supply and demand is quite difficult. Rather, than retrace
the steps of prior research looking unsuccessfully for instruments, we have accepted their
conclusion that instrumenting for household structure is a near impossible undertaking.
3.4 Summary Statistics
Below is a table of summary statistics, which compares each of the three sample groups;
households that had No LUC plots (n=83), with All LUC plots (n=373) and with some LUC
plots termed, “Partial LUC” (n=219), against the other two. Later we will look at a sub-group
of the Partial LUC sample (n=102), that were obliged to grow crops which were not a
consumption preference. This group had the opportunity to modify the crop selection on their
other plots in a possible adjustment to the government mandated crop selection.
There are some significant differences of the means in certain categories some of which
are to be expected given the nature of the data. Others are less obvious. For example, we find
that on average Partial LUC households have more land than the other two groups. This is
logical, as they would need to have more plots to have the outcome with some that are in and
some excluded from the LUC program. Similarly, these households tend to score higher on the
wealth index, lower on the household shocks index and they have fewer “food short months”.
They also have a greater production-consumption alignment, an element we will examine in
more detail later.
There is an interesting a subset of the Partial LUC group (n=102) that was required to
grow non-consumption preference crops on their LUC plots. This sub-group dataset will form
the basis of the search a household reaction to the requirement to use some of their land for
cash crops.
In other areas, such as education, household size, gender and age, the three groups are
quite similar.
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Table'V'<'Summary'Statictics'
Comparing'All'Sample'Groups'
No'LUC
N
'''''Demographics
Male%head
Female%head
Age%HH%Head
Education%HH%Head
HH%Size%
Adult%Males%
Adult%Females
Children

62
21
83
83
83
83
83
83

All'LUC

mean

N

75%
25%
%%%%%%%%%%%43
%%%%%%%2.36
%%%%%%%4.78
%%%%%%%0.95
%%%%%%%1.39
%%%%%%%2.45

308
67
373
371
373
373
373
373

mean

%

t

'''''Production'Alignment
Pct%Consumed%Maize%grown
Pct%Consumed%Beans%grown
Pct%other%HH%food%grown

83
83
83

'''''Other
Food%Short%Months
HH%Shock%Index
HH%Wealth%Index

83 %%%%%%%%%%2.5
83 %%%0.5221
83 %%%0.4576

0.4357
0.5211
0.2438

All'LUC

mean

178
41
219
219
219
219
219
219

81%
19%
47
2.58
5.35
1.35
1.46
2.54

219
219
219

750
76.7
101.8

89.67
48.47
52%
34.03
2.72
178,784
3,134

%
80.311
80.796
82.298 *

%
83 %%%%%54.12
83 %%%%%54.12
%%%%%%%%%8
83 %%%%%29.34
83 %%%%%%%1.81
83 112,238
%
83 %%%%%3,368
150

N

82% %%
18% %
%%%%%%%%%%%45 81.372
%%%%%%%2.56 81.378
%%%%%%%5.37 82.425 *
%%%%%%%1.35 83.567 *
%%%%%%%1.45 80.692
%%%%%%%2.57 80.622

'''Labor'and'Wages
%
%
HH%market%wage
83 %%%%%%%%742 373 %%%%%%%%750
Total%Labor%(days/month)
83 %%%%%%%46.4 373 %%%%%%%50.2
Total%Functional%Labor%(days)
83 %%%%%%%66.9 373 %%%%%%%91.9
'''''Land
Total%HH%Land
Total%non8LUC%land
%%%%Total%pct%land%in%LUC
Average%Plot%Size%(ares)
Total%HH%plots
Total%Harvest%Value%(Rwf)
Yield%per%Are(Rwf)
Total%Plots

Partial'LUC
N

mean

No'LUC
t

Partial'LUC

N

mean

N

mean

%%%62
%%%21
%%%83
%%%83
%%%83
%%%83
%%%83
%%%83

75%
25%
43
%%%%%%%2.36
4.78
0.95
1.39
2.45

%178
%%%41
%219
%219
%219
%219
%219
%219

81%
19%
%%%%%%%%%%%47
%%%%%%%2.58
%%%%%%%5.35
%%%%%%%1.35
%%%%%%%1.46
%%%%%%%2.54

82.084 *
81.129
82.262 *
1.000
0.772
80.455

742 %219
46.4 %219
66.9 %219

750
76.7
101.8

80.339
84.694 *
83.931 *

%219
89.7
%219
48.5
%
52%
%219
34.03
%219
2.72
%219 178,784
%
%219 %%%%%3,134

82.497 *
0.532 %

373
44.54 81.999
373
1.79 10.442 *
373 212,780
%
80.827
373 %%%%%4,869 83.756 *

83
54.1
83
54.1
83 %
83
29.34
83
1.81
83 112,238
%
83 %%%%%3,368

307
82%
66
18%
373 %%%%%%%%%%%45
371 %%%%%%%2.56
373
5.37
373
1.35
373
1.45
373
2.57

1.076
0.212
80.105
0.015
0.053
80.191

373
373
373

0.007
6.671 *
1.336

%

%

750
50.2
91.9

83
83
83

%

373 %%%%%64.98
373 %%%%%%%%%8
100%
373 %%%%%44.54
373 %%%%%%%1.79
373 212,780
%
373 %%%%%4,869
667

81.067

219
219

373
64.98 2.931
373 %%%%%%%%%8
10.642 *

81.905
0.145
81.645
82.088 *

219
219
219
219
596

373
373
373

0.3780
0.4573
0.2562

1.185
1.313
80.590

219
219
219

0.5122
0.6309
0.3391

373
373
373

0.3780
0.4573
0.2562

3.807 *
5.113 *
5.423 *

83
83
83

0.4357
0.5211
0.2438

219
219
219

0.5122
0.6309
0.3391

81.399
82.208 *
83.886 *

372 %%%%%%%%%%2.4
373 %%%0.5303
373 %%%0.4779

0.484
80.254
80.568

216
219
219

1.7
0.4400
0.5537

372
373
373

2.4
0.5303
0.4779

83.460 *
83.884 *
3.135 *

83
83
83

2.5
0.5221
0.4576

219
219
219

1.7
0.4400
0.5537

2.851 *
2.594 *
82.670 *

3.5 Methodology
We will apply three models to test for household separation. The first is from Jacoby
(1993) who uses a reduced form based on a Cobb-Douglas production function, 𝑙𝑜𝑔    𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 ∗ =
𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑤 .   The expectation here is that 𝛽 = 1, for separated households and that the degree of

non-separation will result in β tending towards zero.
The second model is from Benjamin (1992) using an equilibrium shadow wage
specification 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 ∗ = 𝛽  𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑤 + 𝛼𝐴, where A is a vector of household attributes and w is
the market wage for farm laborers. Benjamin uses household demographic composition as the
key household attribute - the number of adult males, adult females and children. In a separated
household, Benjamin predicts that 𝛽 = 1, and 𝛼 = 0.
Third, we apply Le (2010), who combines the two tests above based on the shadow
wage defined by Benjamin and Jacoby. Le derives the shadow wage in a more flexible form
recognizing that w* is the MPL at the farmers expected optimized production level. Beginning
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80.927
86.923 *
81.615
0.466

with a semi-parametric production function 𝑄 = 𝐿!! 𝑓 𝑧, 𝐹, 𝜎 , where f( ) is non-parametric. He
then allows the labor scalar, 𝜆! , to vary across regions (R) and crop types (O) increasing the
flexibility setting 𝜆! = 𝑒 !!!!!!!!!!!! . A random weather shock is captured in 𝜉. Due to this
unknown random weather shock 𝜖:  𝑄 = 𝑄𝑒 ! , farmers’ MPL is based on their expected Q, so that
𝑀𝑃𝐿 =
log

!"# !
!"

!"

=

!"# !
!"

= 𝜆! 𝑝𝑄𝑒 !! . Taking logs and substituting w* for MPL produces:

= − log 𝜆! + log 𝑤 ∗ + 𝜀 , which becomes the basis for Le’s tests.

!

Substituting Benjamin’s shadow wage formulation brings this test:
log

𝑝𝑄
= − log 𝜆! + 𝛼𝐴 + 𝜀
𝑤𝐿

Similarly, Le leverages Jacoby’s form to derive:
log

𝑝𝑄
= − log 𝜆! + 𝛽 log 𝑤 + 𝜀
𝐿

Finally combining the two brings Le’s joint specification:
log

𝑝𝑄
= − log 𝜆! + 𝛽 log 𝑤 + 𝛼𝐴 + 𝜀
𝐿

These are the core specifications that will be used for the separation test. In a separated
household we expect that 𝛽 = 1 and 𝛼 = 0.
Note that Le’s joint specification begins with a production function 𝑄 = 𝐿!!   𝑓(𝑧, 𝐹, 𝜎).=,
where the functional form of f( )was left undefined but the labor input must have a CobbDouglas form. The exponent on the labor factor, 𝜆! = 𝑒 !"!! , is designed to allow variability of
labor productivity by household according to soil quality and crop type. To apply the labor
scalar, 𝜆! , (𝜆𝐿 = 𝑒𝜆0 +𝜆1 𝑅+𝜆2 𝑂+𝜉 ), we followed Le using a CIP crop dummy for crop type (O) and a
regional dummy based on the 42 geographic cells (R). We will see in the empirical section how
this becomes problematical.
We also apply fixed-effects regressions clustered around 42 cells and households in an
attempt to control for unobserved variations in weather and soil quality in the Jacoby and
Benjamin tests. Although the idiosyncratic nature of regional weather patterns and soil quality
(which can vary dramatically every 50 meters) may not be captured in this technique it is the
best measure available in the data.
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Last, we directly examine the alignment of production and consumption in the
household as a possible indicator of separation. Our expectation is that a household that grows
most of what they eat will have a strong association with the non-separated farm household
model.
3.51 Connecting Crop Selection to the Shadow Wage
To validate using the Rwanda data set to measure the effectiveness of the separation
hypothesis tests by Jacoby, Benjamin and Le, it is essential to establish the theoretical
relationship between household crop selection decisions and the rationale behind the household
allocation of labor, a key component of the shadow wage w*. Note that the shadow wage
calculations in all the empirical models are estimates using the log of the average wage or
log

!"

, rather than the marginal product of labor or first order condition from the production

!

function.
Since we are making the assertion that LUC plots are managed in a separated model as
a result of exogenous crop selection, we need to show that the loss of the crop selection decision
to external parties will have an impact on the shadow wage - the measure used in the tests.
Further, we should be able to predict in a theoretical model how that linkage works and
whether the relationship is positive or negative.
We proceed as follows using Le’s simple construct:
Assume a household utility function: 𝑈 𝑐, 𝑙;   𝐴 where c is consumption, l is leisure and A
is a vector of household preference drivers such as family structure, education etc.
Assume also a household production function: 𝑌 = 𝑄  (𝐿, 𝐹) + 𝑤𝑚, where Q, the family
farm output, is a function of, L, labor and, F is a vector of fixed and variable inputs including
land, seed fertilizer, farm equipment etc. In this production function, m is the desired labor
outside of the family farm, w is the market wage and p is the value assigned by the family to the
farm output, either market prices or a utility value or shadow price, p*. (Lopez 1983) If the
household consumes all its output, then U, is constrained by a budget: 𝑐 = 𝑝𝑄 + 𝑤𝑚. Further, m
is constrained by the traditional time allocation model where 𝑇 = 𝑙 + 𝐿 + 𝑚. In a constrained
labor market m will either be zero or limited to an upper bound, M.
Now we maximize U subject to the budget constraint using a Lagrangian function:
1     ℒ = 𝑈 𝑐, 𝑙; 𝐴 + 𝜆(𝑐 − 𝑝𝑄 − 𝑤𝑚)
2     ℒ = 𝑈 𝑐, 𝑙; 𝐴 + 𝜆(𝑐 − 𝑝𝑄 − 𝑤(𝑇 − 𝑙 − 𝐿))
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3     ℒ ! = 𝑈! + 𝜆𝑤 = 0   =>    𝑈! = −𝜆𝑤

first order condition for l

4     ℒ ! = 𝑈! + 𝜆 = 0 =>    𝑈! = −𝜆

first order condition for c

5     𝑤 ∗ =

!!

solving for w*

!!

Recall that, 𝑈! is directly a function of price and that 𝑈! is only indirectly dependent on
price, that is, the price effect on consumption is more pronounced than on the demand for
leisure. Demand for leisure will decline somewhat due to increase demand for labor if prices
rise, but the movement is constrained by available inputs, such as land. Thus, when the
household assigns a value to the crop, p*, greater than the market price, p, they labor under the
false assumption that their shadow wage, w*, is higher than the market wage. Using actual
market prices to evaluate the shadow wage instead of p*, will result in a w* below the market
wage, w.
This establishes the relationship between crop selection and w*. The relationship is
consistent with the common observation that households over invest in labor on their own
plots because they assign a higher value to their consumption crops than the market price of
those crops. Consequently, they are undervaluing their own labor with respect to the market
wage, or w* < w.
In the case of a household in the LUC program where they are obliged to grow nonconsumption crops, the household will undervalue those crops relative to their original
preference for consumption crops. The decline in utility means p* will tend towards the market
price p as the households will have no other reference value for these cash crops. Households
will adjust (reduce) their allocation of labor so that the shadow wage, w*, will tend towards the
market wage, w.
According to this analysis, as the crop decision becomes exogenous and involves nonpreference crops, we should observe increasing alignment of the shadow wage with the market
wage. Further, in cases where the exogenous crop decision happens to include the preference
crops, the alignment of the shadow wage with the market wage should be less pronounced.

4. TESTING FOR HOUSEHOLD SEPARATION
4.1 Applying Jacoby
The simplified Jacoby test regresses the log of the average wage (pQ/L), a proxy for
the shadow wage, against the market wage. The prediction is that the coefficient of the market
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wage will approach unity as a household moves closer to the separated model. As we had two
labor measures available, total HH functional labor and total HH labor, we created a dependent
variable with both. There was no significant difference in the test results using the two labor
measures so we chose to present the dependent calculated with the functional labor measure.
Table VI, shows that the coefficient on the market wage moves closer to 1 as the LUC
participation increases. The coefficients for the partial-LUC and All LUC are significant,
whereas the coefficient for the household group expected to be non-separated are small and
insignificant. In effect, as the crop decision becomes more exogenous, the household moves
towards a separated model and the difference between shadow wage and market wage shrinks.
The test also held up when we included an indicator for LUC program crops (CIPcrop). That
wasn’t the case using geographic indicators, such as, sector or agricultural zones. The test also
performed poorly in a fixed-effects regression clustered around the 42 geographic designations
(administrative cells).
Table'VI'/'Jacoby'Test'Results
Simplified'Jacoby
Depndent:'log'(w*)'='log'(pQ/L)

!
log_HH_mktwage

Jacoby'with'Crops
Depndent:'log'(w*)'='log'(pQ/L)

No#LUC
83
0.15059
!!!!(0.54311)

Partial#LUC
All#LUC
219
373
'
0.77379 *
1.13587 *
!!!!(0.33633)
!!!!(0.25610)

A0.36013
!!!!!!(1.6840)

No#LUC
83
!!!!!!!!0.1478
!!!!!!(0.5388)
A0.01570
!!!!!!(0.6898)
!!!!!!!!5.8521
!!!!!!(3.6402)

5.81936
!!!!!!(3.5688)

1.89718
!!!!!!(2.2214)

21.42

0.04

CIPcrop
_cons

F!test
0.07
Standard!errors!appear!in!parentheses

6.61

Partial#LUC
All#LUC
219
373
0.73808 *
1.17019 *
!!!!(0.34441)
!!!!(0.26995)
A0.253011
!!!!!0.17066
!!!!(0.24209)
!!!!(0.18996)
2.35779
A0.73114
!!!!!!(2.3261)
!!!!!!(1.8458)
3.4

9.8

4.2 Applying Benjamin
Benjamin’s original test depends on an approximation of the shadow wage: log  (𝑤 ∗ ) =
𝛽log  (𝑤) + 𝛼𝐴, where A is a vector of preference shifters defined by household composition

(adult males, adult females and children). Using the same proxy for shadow wage, log  (pQ)/L,
Benjamin predicts that for non-separated households, the preference shifters have a greater
influence on shadow wage than the market wage or that 𝛽 = 0, and 𝛼 = 1.
Applying Benjamin’s test did not prove out that theory. (Table VII). The non-LUC
group that we expected to be non-separated did not show any significant influence on the
shadow wage by the preference shifters. In fact total children was significant in the group we
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expected to show as separated households – exactly the opposite effect that Benjamin would
have predicted. The results are surprising in that the preference shifters also define to a certain
extent the available supply of labor to the farm-household.
Le’s modification of Benjamin, log

!"
!"

= − log 𝜆! + 𝛼𝐴 , reduces the independent

variables to the preference shifters and a modifier of labor productivity, log 𝜆! , defined by
regional and crop variations. As described above, the regional measures in the data were not
useful, so we applied Le using only the crop indicator. In any case, the results were similar.
Preferences shifters were only significant in the All LUC case, just the opposite of the model
prediction. The cell clustered fixed effects regressions produced similar outcomes (results not
presented).
Table'VII'?'Benjamin'Test'Results
Original'Benjamin
Dependent:''log'(w*)'='log'(pQ/L)

!
log_HH_mktwage
total_adult_females
total_adult_males
total_children

No#LUC
83
!!!!!0.16132
!!!!(0.57372)
0.10245
!!!!(0.17297)
0.15099
!!!!(0.19119)
0.10809
!!!!(0.08512)

Benjamin'(Le's'Modification)'with'Crop
Dependent:''log'(pQ/wL)

Partial#LUC
All#LUC
219
373
!!!!!0.76660 * !!!!!1.21172 *
!!!!(0.30355)
!!!!(0.24552)
=0.06094
=0.05620
!!!!(0.10218)
!!!!(0.08370)
0.06462
0.12998
!!!!(0.07812)
!!!!(0.07156)
0.07244
0.09509 *
!!!!(0.04316)
!!!!(0.03866)

1.76204
!!!!(2.03208)

=1.19733
!!!!(1.63827)

0.09125
!!!!(0.13465)
0.20820
!!!!(0.24030)
0.10632
!!!!(0.07308)
0.26714
!!!!(0.65090)
=0.60719
!!!!(0.72502)

2.63

7.61

0.86

CIPcrop
_cons

5.19862
!!!!(3.79267)

F!test
0.65
Standard!errors!appear!in!parentheses

No#LUC
83

'

Partial#LUC
219
'

All#LUC
373

=0.04923
!!!!(0.08702)
0.05520
!!!!(0.07219)
0.07257
!!!!(0.04651)
=0.19332
!!!!(0.23807)
0.39121
!!!!(0.40403)

=0.06072
!!!!(0.07708)
0.12460
!!!!(0.05962)
0.09226
!!!!(0.03771)
0.15555
!!!!(0.18287)
0.08564
!!!!(0.22219)

0.93

2.61

'

!
*
*
!
!
!

These results provoke the question – why didn’t the Benjamin test work as expected?
We speculate that household demographics, although a key component of labor supply, lack
variability by household and are too broad to be a strong determinant of the shadow wage
relationship.
To address that question we modified Benjamin’s original relationship with a measure of
the alignment of the household production with its consumption preferences. Using the answer
to the question, “During the past 12 months what was the most important source of the main
food the family eats?” The alignment measures were based on the response, “Own production.”
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We see the results in Table VIII. In this case, using household production-consumption
alignment rather than household demographics, Benjamin’s test performed exactly as expected.
The coefficient on market wage is close to zero for the non-separated households and the
coefficients on the alignment measures for maize and beans are significant. Further, as the
households are forced from non-separated (no-LUC) to a separated (All LUC) model, the
coefficient on market wage climbs to one and is increasingly significant. Moreover, none of the
consumption alignment factors are important influences on the shadow wage for either the
partial LUC or All LUC groups.
Table.VIII.J.Benjamin.with.Consumption.Alignment.Test.Results
Original.Benjamin.with.Consumption.Alignment
Dependent:..log.(w*).=.log.(pQ/L)
!
log_HH_mktwage
pct_maize_grown
pct_beans_grown
pct_other_total_food_grown
!
_cons

No#LUC
83
0.03181
!!!!!(0.54752)
A0.95119 *
!!!!!(0.40192)
0.89573 *
!!!!!(0.43151)
1.33978
!!!!!(0.80484)
6.22267
!!!!!(3.58653)

F!test
2.64
Standard!errors!appear!in!parentheses

Partial#LUC
219
0.77040 *
!!!!!(0.30681)
A0.10642
!!!!!(0.19593)
0.09935
!!!!!(0.21418)
0.00134
!!!!!(0.43763)
1.91087
!!!!!(2.05321)

All#LUC
373
1.08512 *
!!!!!(0.24998)
A0.28603
!!!!!(0.19426)
0.05184 !
!!!!!(0.20189)
A0.56479
!!!!!(0.42754)
0.20317
!!!!!(1.66651)

1.73

7.04

4.3 Applying Le’s Joint Specification
The theoretical specification in Le’s general form, log

!"
!

= − log 𝜆! + 𝛽 log 𝑤 +

𝛼𝐴 + 𝜀, creates an empirical difficulty in that the first independent term, 𝜆𝐿 = 𝑒𝜆0 +𝜆1 𝑅+𝜆2 𝑂+𝜉 ,

requires the log of non-continuous dummy variables. To overcome this Le simply includes the
dummies in the regression. We used a CIP crop dummy for crop type (O) and two different
regional dummies (R), based on the agro-ecological zones and the 42 geographic cells. The cell
dummies presented difficulties in that the degrees of freedom in some cells were very small.
The results are displayed in Table IX. In no case did Le’s joint specification produce the
expected results. This is not too surprising, as the Benjamin test had failed with the household
demographic preference shifters. Retaining those regressors and adding the complexity of
geographic and crop dummies was unlikely to produce a better outcome.
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Table'IX'?'Le's'Joint'Specification'Test'Results

!
log_HH_mktwage
total_adult_females
total_adult_males
total_children
CIPcrop
AZ1
AZ2
AZ3
AZ4
AZ5
AZ6
AZ7
AZ8
AZ9
_cons

Le's'Joint'Specification'with'Agro?zones
Dependent:''log'(w*)'='log'(pQ/L)

Le's'Joint'Specification'with'Cells'(a)
Dependent:''log'(w*)'='log'(pQ/L)

No#LUC
Partial#LUC
All#LUC
83
219
373
0.95098
0.27690
0.53335 *
!!!!(0.63756)
!!!!(0.30921)
!!!!(0.24902)
70.01092
70.02464
70.02854
!!!!(0.14017)
!!!!(0.07871)
!!!!(0.08087)
0.37555
0.09371
0.07999
!!!!(0.25045)
!!!!(0.07042)
!!!!(0.05391)
0.10302
0.10224 *
0.10719 *
!!!!(0.07480)
!!!!(0.04561)
!!!!(0.03648)
0.00240
70.18118
0.05803
!!!!(0.63696)
!!!!(0.25375)
!!!!(0.22967)
0.64926
70.42038
70.43719
!!!!(0.50257)
!!!!(0.40656)
!!!!(0.21954)
70.72851
0.19376
70.30915
!!!!(0.88774)
!!!!(0.47120)
!!!!(0.34787)
0.48939
0.94645 *
0.62823
!!!!(0.74088)
!!!!(0.42403)
!!!!(0.19911)
0.50694
70.50345
70.33735
!!!!(0.51440)
!!!!(0.40334)
!!!!(0.24171)
70.50434
71.40846
0.00000
!!!!(0.50936)
!!!!(0.40141)
(omitted)
0.07628
70.45907
70.11777
!!!!(0.42373)
!!!!(0.36106)
!!!!(0.22340)
0.00000
71.32957 *
71.40696
(omitted)
!!!!(0.42130)
!!!!(0.31195)
0.00000
70.32916
70.18090
(omitted)
!!!!(0.39133)
!!!!(0.30503)
0.97659 *
0.00000
1.15660
!!!!(0.44665)
(omitted)
!!!!(0.28129)
70.32161
5.46799
3.29580
!!!!(4.33613)
!!!!(2.17184)
!!!!(1.78379)

No#LUC
Partial#LUC
All#LUC
83
'
219
'
373
'
0.66582
70.43582
0.38608
!!!!(1.25668)
!!!!(0.40175)
!!!!(0.34663)
0.03587
70.05749
70.04732
!!!!(0.21980)
!!!!(0.09201)
!!!!(0.07681)
0.31742
0.06724
0.03120
!!!!(0.24004)
!!!!(0.07459)
!!!!(0.06372)
0.09915
0.02983
0.09363
!!!!(0.09112)
!!!!(0.04040)
!!!!(0.03509) *
0.43020
70.01012
0.07931
!!!!(0.68682)
!!!!(0.23574)
!!!!(0.22892)

F!test
1.25
(a)!Results!for!41!cells!omitted!for!brevity
Standard!errors!appear!in!parentheses

4.48

9.67

2.27622
!!!!(8.56767)

11.29462
!!!!(2.88296)

6.16570
!!!!(2.38415)

1.04

3.72

6.21

We also tested Le’s formula while replacing the household demographic preference
shifters with the production-consumption alignment indicators as in our prior modification of
Benjamin. This change did not improve the efficacy of the test as none of the important
variables have significant coefficients. Further, there is no obvious relationship between the
coefficients and the status of the household in terms of its relationship to market factors. The
results are shown in Table X.
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Table'X'>'Le's'Joint'Specification'with'Consumption>Production'Alignment
Le's'Joint'Specification'with'Agro>zones
Dependent:''log'(w*)'='log'(pQ/L)
No#LUC
83
0.36219
!!!!!!!!!!!(0.66924)
pct_maize_grown
70.70106
!!!!!!!!!!!(0.44016)
pct_beans_grown
0.79701
!!!!!!!!!!!(0.44260)
pct_totalHH_other_food_grown
1.34578
!!!!!!!!!!!(0.88659)
CIPcrop
70.15411
!!!!!!!!!!!(0.49479)
AZ1
0.60072
!!!!!!!!!!!(0.83011)
AZ2
70.17574
!!!!!!!!!!!(1.08998)
AZ3
0.77135
!!!!!!!!!!!(1.02329)
AZ4
0.57664
!!!!!!!!!!!(0.89154)
AZ5
70.27004
!!!!!!!!!!!(0.86343)
AZ6
0.17246
!!!!!!!!!!!(0.86826)
AZ7
0.00000
(omitted)
AZ8
0.00000
(omitted)
AZ9
0.90832
!!!!!!!!!!!(0.89858)
_cons
3.77840
!!!!!!!!!!!(4.43166)
!
log_HH_mktwage

F!test
(a)!Results!for!41!cells!omitted!for!brevity
Standard!errors!appear!in!parentheses

1.61

Partial#LUC
All#LUC
219
373
0.30941
0.45529
!!!!(0.30989)
!!!!(0.26404)
70.06632
70.32962
!!!!(0.19512)
!!!!(0.18967)
0.42212
0.40254 *
!!!!(0.21957)
!!!!(0.19981)
0.54064
0.25927
!!!!(0.42097)
!!!!(0.41159)
70.20428
0.02594
!!!!(0.22913)
!!!!(0.19744)
70.48994
70.07822
!!!!(0.44321)
!!!!(1.14896)
0.22202
0.20583
!!!!(0.51565)
!!!!(1.17713)
1.05727
1.14555
!!!!(0.51488)
!!!!(1.15948)
70.32481
0.16164
!!!!(0.42532)
!!!!(1.15938)
71.56641 *
0.00000
!!!!(0.50350)
(omitted)
70.55387
0.28983
!!!!(0.41555)
!!!!(1.14572)
71.40106 *
71.07418
!!!!(0.45460)
!!!!(1.17014)
70.16288
0.23521
!!!!(0.47060)
!!!!(1.16973)
0.00000
1.63588
(omitted)
!!!!(1.16322)
5.23042
3.62187
!!!!(2.18073)
!!!!(2.16676)
4.37

9.23

Le's'Joint'Specification'with'Cells'(a)
Dependent:''log'(w*)'='log'(pQ/L)
No#LUC
Partial#LUC
All#LUC
83
'
219
'
373
'
0.07623
70.29921
0.44316
!!!!(1.27244)
!!!!(0.39844)
!!!!(0.34617)
70.47475
0.13126
70.28671
!!!!(0.50663)
!!!!(0.19597)
!!!!(0.18932)
0.66387
0.20644
0.51765
!!!!(0.49672)
!!!!(0.21330)
!!!!(0.22088)
0.94650
0.76431
0.47026
!!!!(0.99934)
!!!!(0.39867)
!!!!(0.40687)
0.12318
0.00439
70.05899
!!!!(0.65172)
!!!!(0.23195)
!!!!(0.23081)

7.48781
!!!!(8.65199)

10.33107
!!!!(2.80926)

6.08611
!!!!(2.37120)

1.08

4.00

6.21

5. HOUSEHOLD REACTION TO THE LUC PROGRAM
A key attribute of the non-separated household is the desire to mitigate food security
risk directly by growing the crops that the family eats – what we have termed the productionconsumption alignment. The complement to this attribute is the reluctance to rely on cash
crops and markets to provide for the family’s sustenance.
In the LUC program, some households were forced to forgo their preferred
consumption crops in favor of cash crops. In essence, they are obliged to take on the exact risk
that they sought to avoid via crop selection. How does the household react to that change?
The structure of the data in this study allows us to consider that household reaction
directly. We have a wide variation of LUC treatment (141 values as percent of LUC land for a
household) in the partial-LUC household group (n=219). Some of these households (n=102)
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had a portion of their land moved into non-consumption crops reducing their ability to align
farm production with consumption. How is crop selection different in this group compared to
the non-LUC households who have freedom of choice in crop selection? Are they able to
preserve the risk-mitigating production-consumption alignment?
Table XI presents summary statistics for these two groups. There are some significant
differences. The non-LUC household heads are younger, more female with smaller families and
fewer adult males. The difference in family size may account for the variation in labor rates.
The alignment measures are also

Table'XI'='Summary'Statictics'Partial=LUC'Non=Staple

interesting. With less land available for

Comparing'Partial=LUC'(Non=Staple)'with'Non=LUC'
Partial'LUC'
(Non=Staple)
N
mean

consumption crops and a larger family,
these households were able to match and
in some cases exceed the productionconsumption alignment of the non-LUC
households.
Most important was a larger
presence of adult males in the household
contributing to a higher labor rate. They
also had a higher level of wealth, which
allowed them to bring in outside labor. In
effect,

these

households

were

more

productive with their “free plots” which
were seeded mostly in consumption crops,
maize and beans, the same crops they
could not grow on their LUC controlled
plots.
Last, we evaluated the notion that
the partial-LUC households that were in
programs growing cash crops would test
as more separated (their shadow wage is

'''''Demographics
Male%Head
Female%Head
Head%gender
Age%HH%Head
Education%HH%Head
HH%Size%
Adult%Males%
Adult%Females
Children
'''Labor'and'Wages
HH%market%wage
Total%Labor%(days/month)
Total%Functional%Labor%(days)
'''''Land
Total%HH%Land
Total%non9LUC%land
%%%%Total%pct%land%in%LUC
Average%Plot%Size%(ares)
Total%HH%plots
Total%Harvest%Value%(Rwf)
Yield%per%Are%(Rwf)
Total%Plots
'''''Production'Alignment
Pct%Consumed%Maize%grown
Pct%Consumed%Beans%grown
Pct%other%HH%food%grown
'''''Other
Food%Short%Months
HH%Shock%Index
HH%Wealth%Index

81
79%
21
21%
102 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%0.794
102
46.1
102
2.44
102
5.32
102
1.38
102
1.40
102
2.53
%
%
102
102
102

818.07
71.6
94.1

%
%
102
59.42
102
35.92
102
64%
102
22.04
102
2.70
102 %%%%%%%%%%167,754
102 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%2,823
102
275
%
102
102
102

41.2%
57.5%
29.9%

102
102
102

1.8
0.4275
0.5325

%
%

%

No'LUC
N

mean

62
21
83
83
83
83
83
83
83
%
%
83
83
83
%
%
83
83
83
83
83
83
83
83

75%
25%
%%%%%0.747
%%%%%%%43.0
%%%%%%%2.36
%%%%%%%4.78
%%%%%%%0.95
%%%%%%%1.39
%%%%%%%2.45

90.758
91.462
90.518
91.907
93.285 *
90.147
90.340

742.39
46.4
66.9

93.023 *
93.912 *
92.942 *

%%%%%54.12
%%%%%54.12
%%%%%%%%%9
%%%%%29.34
%%%%%%%1.81
112,238
%
%%%%%3,368
%%%%%%%%150

%
83
43.6%
83
52.1%
83
24.4%
%
%
83 %%%%%%%%%%2.5
83 %%%%%0.522
83 %%%%%0.458
%

more sensitive to market wages) than those households partially in LUC programs growing the
preferred consumption crops (staples). To do this we applied Benjamin’s test modified with the
alignment variables developed in the study. The results are presented in Table XII.
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t
%

90.464
1.967
0.951
95.554 *
91.883
91.094

0.396
90.945
93.886 *

2.250 *
2.514 *
91.706

We find that those households forced out of consumption crops became very sensitive to
market wages, exhibiting greater separation type behavior than even the group where crop
selection was entirely exogenous.
Table,XII,/,Benjamin,with,Consumption,Alignment,(Partial,LUC,Split)
Original,Benjamin,with,Consumption,Alignment
Dependent:,,log,(w*),=,log,(pQ/L)
No#LUC
!
log_HH_mktwage
pct_maize_grown
pct_beans_grown
pct_other_food_grown
!
_cons

83
0.03181
!!!!!!(0.5475)
A0.95119 *
!!!!!!(0.4019)
0.89573 *
!!!!!!(0.4315)
1.33978
!!!!!!(0.8048)
6.22267
!!!!!!(3.5865)

Partial#LUC#
in#staples
117
0.06813
!!!!!!(0.4118)
A0.09381
!!!!!!(0.2780)
0.34588
!!!!!!(0.3011)
A0.59781
!!!!!!(0.6047)
6.50647
!!!!!!(2.7326)

F!test
2.64
Standard!errors!appear!in!parentheses

0.55

All#LUC

Partial#LUC#
not#in#staples

373
102
1.08512 *
2.51944 *
!!!!!!(0.2500)
!!!!!!!!!!!(0.5513)
A0.28603
0.21045
!!!!!!(0.1943)
!!!!!!!!!!!(0.2743)
0.05184 !
A0.56703
!!!!!!(0.2019)
!!!!!!!!!!!(0.3043)
A0.56479
0.88792
!!!!!!(0.4275)
!!!!!!!!!!!(0.6135)
0.20317
A9.77480
!!!!!!(1.6665)
!!!!!!!!!!!(3.6822)
7.04

6. CONCLUSIONS
We used a unique data set from Rwanda to evaluate the effectiveness of several tests for
household separation. We find that the simplified Jacoby and Benjamin tests comparing the
degree of alignment of the market wage to a shadow wage to be good indicators. Le’s joint
specification was less useful as were the modifications for household structure as a proxy for
consumption preferences and geographic indicators to control for weather and soil quality.
We applied a direct self-reported measure of production-consumption alignment as a
replacement for household structure in Benjamin and Le. This modification showed the shift in
separation that Benjamin had predicted.
Finally, we evaluated household reaction to the LUC program in the only instance
where households retained some land resources to exhibit a reaction. We found that as the crop
decisions became exogenous forcing the use of non-preference crops, we observed an increasing
alignment of the shadow wage with the market wage. Further, in cases where the exogenous
crop decision happens to include the preference crops, the alignment of the shadow wage with
the market wage was much less pronounced.
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